University of
New Hampshire
Carsey School of
Public Policy

CARSEY RESEARCH
National Issue Brief #149

Summer 2020

‘Outlaw Operators’
Prevention Failures and the Resurgence of Black Lung
in Central Appalachia
Aysha A. Bodenhamer

C

oal workers’ pneumoconiosis, a preventable
occupational and environmental disease commonly referred to as black lung, was thought to be
a moot issue after the enactment in 1969 of the Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act, which created sweeping health and
safety reforms and was followed by a significant decline in
black lung cases. However, the disease became resurgent
in the United States in the early 2000s,1 and it is back in
central Appalachia at unprecedented levels. Recently,
20.6 percent of long-tenure miners (25-plus years) who
were tested in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia
tested positive for black lung.2
This brief, based on interviews with miners, clinic
workers, black lung attorneys, government employees,
and lay advocates as well as a case-study analysis of two
black lung clinics in southwest Virginia, describes how
prevention failures in the coal mining industry have
resulted in the resurgence of black lung.

Black lung slowly corrodes the quality of life of miners
and their families until it eventually leads to death: “I’m
aggravated that I can’t do things. It’s just there all the time.”

The Horror of Black Lung

Failed Prevention Efforts

Caused by the chronic inhalation of coal and silica
dust, black lung is progressive, incurable, life-altering,
and fatal.3 One miner interviewed for this study
described his experience as a “smothering sensation”:

What is most troubling about black lung is that it is
preventable.5 Many interviewees, particularly government officials within the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) claim
that if dust protocols were followed, black lung would
not exist. This interviewee, a pulmonologist, states:

It’s almost like a sensation that you’re drowning on
dry land. Especially when it progresses. You really
never can catch enough breath, and over time it
gets worse and worse, and so you’re sort of gasping
for air. Even in a seated position—not moving, not
exercising—you just can’t get enough air into your
lungs. You can’t get enough oxygen into your blood.
And then it just goes downhill until your body
physically just can no longer survive with that little
amount of oxygen and you die.4
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I always say, it’s not rocket science; you get black
lung disease from breathing too much coal dust. It’s
very simple. We know what causes it, we know how
to prevent it, we know that the measures that are in
place in law can prevent the majority of [black lung]
disease that’s out there. And the frustration for me is
the fact that that is not upheld.6
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Noncompliance With
Dust Regulations and
Falsified Dust Sampling
Noncompliance with dust regulations is a notable concern among
Appalachian miners. Regulators,
other government employees, and
miners who were interviewed note
that negligent dust practices and
fraudulent dust sampling have
become commonplace in many
Appalachian mines, yet coal operators report “compliant” numbers.
As one regulator notes:
Cheating on the dust sampling,
that still goes on all the time....
The old system.…is basically
this dust pump that just measures how much dust is collected into it.…There’s nothing
in the apparatus that can say
where it’s been during this time.
And what would typically happen, and a million guys tell me
this sort of thing, you would
wrap it [dust monitor] in rags.
You would put it in a dinner
bucket. You would go hang it in
the fresh air intake, where nothing but clean air is blowing over
it the whole time.7
Hiding evidence from inspectors and falsifying dust samples
has become so routinized in the
mines, interviewees say, that miners
are instructed to change practices
when inspectors are present: “Their
[the coal operators] main reason
is to make money and run coal. If
inspectors come, more is done to
cover the dust.” Many miners report
that ventilation curtains were only
hung when inspectors were present. Since underground mines are
typically inspected four times a year,
this assertion implies that mines are

likely operating incorrectly 361 days
a year. Most research participants
argue that many coal operators do
not follow dust regulations because
it costs too much money, and that
this “outlaw operator” phenomenon
is unique to central Appalachia:
“You just have more outlaw
operators here. You just do. More
scofflaw.”8 But it is the experience of
interviewees that Appalachian coal
companies continue to deny culpability and routinely externalize the
cost of black lung:

plague their users: in 2018, 3M
paid $67.5 million to Kentucky
miners who used faulty respirators in coal mining operations.11
Miners continue to believe that
respirators are approved mechanisms of defense, but dust prevention requires mechanical controls
such as water sprays, scrubbers,
and ventilation systems.12 These
misconceptions point to deficient
miner safety and health training.

I was shocked when this
person in the coal industry
told me, ‘It’s just not relevant
to us because we don’t pay for
it’…in other words, there’s not
a human value there at all.
There’s nothing—that there
are people who are dying and
are having a miserable life
gasping for breath, and that’s
not a relevant concern.9

Mines are required to arrange
opportunities for annual black
lung screenings, free of charge,
but few miners take advantage
of them. According to a government official, “They get a free test
every year from the Department
of Labor.…They can do it every
year for the rest of their lives.” Yet
interviews suggest that many miners remain fearful of losing their
jobs if they get tested for black
lung, even though NIOSH assures
that screening is confidential. One
research participant said that miners “are afraid…because if the coal
company finds out that they are
going to a black lung clinic, or that
they are having chest x-rays done,
they’re going to fire them and get
somebody else in to work.” In this
sense, proactive miners who wish
to be tested for black lung are
equivalent to whistleblowers in
the company’s eyes, thus creating
a vulnerable situation for themselves and their communities.
Regions with stagnant economies
are even more defenseless. Some
researchers argue that this culture
of fear resonates among miners
due to precarious coal employment in Appalachia.13

Poor Training and
Understanding of
Chronic Dust Exposure
Despite evidence that black lung is
preventable, central Appalachia is
in the midst of the largest spike in
prevalence in over 30 years. Many
miners believe that black lung is
inevitable: “There ain’t no way of
preventing it. They make respirators. Some do and some don’t
[wear them]. I don’t see any way
of avoiding black lung.” The twin
perceptions that black lung is not
preventable and that a miner is
personally to blame for not using a
respirator are common among coal
workers. However, respirators have
been shown to be an unreliable line
of defense,10 and quality problems

Black Lung Screening
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Figure 1 uses data from
NIOSH’s Coal Workers’ Health
Surveillance Program (CWHSP)
to show the continued concentration of black lung in central
Appalachia (the region situated
in Kentucky, Virginia, and West
Virginia) compared to the rest of
the United States. Although the
CWHSP is immensely helpful for
tracking black lung prevalence, its
estimates capture only active and
voluntary miners who have been
tested; many retired and untested
active miners are not represented
in its data. Annual mandatory
testing of all miners would limit
the unfavorable bias toward proactive miners and allow the collection of accurate black lung data.
MSHA has sanctioned some
health and safety improvements in
recent years. For instance, MSHA
recently decreased the respirable
dust limit from 2 mg/m3 to 1.5 mg/
m3 after the previous limit was
found to be ineffective. MSHA
also implemented the use of
continuous personal dust monitors to cut down on dust fraud
and improve real-time reporting.14
The outcomes of these changes are
unknown at this time; indeed, the
lag effect of black lung could leave
us uninformed for years to come.
While these changes are important, they are inadequate without
industry buy-in and government
enforcement.
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FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF ACTIVE, UNDERGROUND, LONG-TENURE (25-PLUS
YEARS) COAL MINERS WITH BLACK LUNG IN KENTUCKY, VIRGINIA, AND WEST
VIRGINIA COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974–2017

Note: Data include only active miners who voluntarily participated in black lung screening.
Source: NIOSH Coal Workers Health Surveillance Program Data Query System, 2020
(https://webappa.cdc.gov/ords/cwhsp-database.html)

Black Lung
Compensation Claims
While the deficiencies of black
lung prevention are many, black
lung compensation is equally
problematic. In West Virginia at
least, miners are developing black

lung at unprecedented rates, even
though fewer are tested (see Figure
2). Given the progressive nature of
black lung even after dust exposure
stops, this upward trend is alarming.
And though coal employment is at
a historic low, production trends
have recently increased after a long

FIGURE 2. TOTAL MINERS TESTED AND PERCENTAGE OF MINERS WITH
BLACK LUNG IN WEST VIRGINIA, 1970–2014

Source: NIOSH Coal Workers Health Surveillance Program Data Query System, 2020
(https://webappa.cdc.gov/ords/cwhsp-database.html)
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downward spiral (see Figure 3). This
trend could imply that miners are
being overexposed to coal dust as
fewer employees work longer hours
to make up for a reduced workforce.
Moreover, many coal companies
have filed for bankruptcy, putting
miners’ health care, pensions, and
black lung benefits at risk.
Black lung benefits consist of a
monthly payment of $669.30 and a
medical card for single filers. Only
18.02 percent of filed black lung
claims were awarded in 2017,15 and
the average time it took for miners
in this study to acquire their benefits
was six years, with a range from one
year to two decades. Yet despite the
low disbursement rates and rising
prevalence, the coal industry continues to demand lower tax rates. Even
during the COVID-19 pandemic,
the National Mining Association
has promoted a 50 percent cut to the
$1.10/ton excise tax for underground
coal and $0.55 tax for surface coal
that are used to fund the Black Lung
Benefits Trust Fund.16 The fund has
nearly always operated at a deficit,
and decreasing the coal excise tax
would ultimately shift the financial
burden of black lung benefits from
coal operators to taxpayers.
Black lung is not only a public
health disaster,17 it is also a social
justice issue. Receiving compensation for black lung is rooted in an
adversarial process: miners must
prove their work history and total
disability from black lung before
they have a “legitimate” case. These
legal battles between miners and
goliath coal company legal teams
are often insurmountable for miners, given their limited resources
and time, and even after being
awarded benefits many miners fear
losing them due to the precarious
nature of the industry.

FIGURE 3. WEST VIRGINIA COAL PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT, 1900–2018

Source: West Virginia Coal Association, “Coal Facts 2019,” 2019
(https://www.wvcoal.com/resources/coal-facts/5176-coal-facts-2019)

Issues such as skirting regulations,
falsifying records, and putting workers at risk are not isolated events or
unique to the coal mining industry.
Many workers across the industrial
spectrum experience similar precarious work environments in which
profit is prioritized over human
health and safety. Shortcuts to safety
and health create only short-term
gains, while the accumulated longterm cost and risk are much greater.
We must provide safe work environments for all employees, as intended
by the Department of Labor.

Opportunities for Policy
and Practice
•

•

Industry buy-in and government
enforcement of mine safety regulations are essential. The coal
industry must follow dust protocols and implement appropriate
mechanical dust controls. Coal
companies must be held responsible by government agencies for
failing to prevent black lung.
Coal companies should receive
briefings on NIOSH data trends,
up-to-date research findings,

and best practices in the
workplace, and participate in
the National Coalition of Black
Lung and Respiratory Disease
Clinics annual conference.
•

Miners should receive updated
and improved annual MSHA
miner safety training and a
confidential, secure means of
reporting safety violations.

•

More frequent MSHA checkins and inspections should be
instituted to enhance compliance
with health and safety standards.

•

Mandatory annual black lung
screenings should be instituted
in order to eliminate the stigma
felt by proactive coal workers.

•

The adversarial nature of black
lung compensation claims
should be reformed, and a sliding scale of benefits should be
created for miners with a black
lung diagnosis.

•

The coal excise tax should be
increased by $0.25/ton to eliminate the Black Lung Benefits
Trust Fund debt and secure the
fund for future claimants.18
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Data and Methods

Endnotes

This research is based on four
years of triangulated qualitative
and quantitative data. Primary
data were accumulated through
in-depth interviews starting in
2015 with 25 key informants
including miners, black lung clinic
workers, black lung attorneys,
government employees, and lay
advocates. A second wave of data
collection commenced in 2019
with a case-study analysis of two
black lung clinics in southwest
Virginia. Twenty-four additional
interviews with miners and clinic
workers were collected during
this time, for a total of 59 interviews. Quantitative data for coal
production and employment are
reported by the West Virginia Coal
Association in its annual Coal
Facts publication.19 Prevalence data
for central Appalachia are collected by the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health
through the Coal Workers’ Health
Surveillance Program.20 These data
are aggregated at the county level
and reported in five-year intervals.
Additional data were gathered
through participant observation,
document analysis, and news
articles. Participant observation
took place in 2015, 2016, and 2018
at the national and regional black
lung conferences supported by the
National Coalition of Black Lung
and Respiratory Disease Clinics.
To triangulate and extend the
analysis, I also incorporated document analysis from government
agencies including NIOSH, the
MSHA, and the Division of Coal
Mine Workers’ Compensation; the
United Mine Workers of America;
and news articles.
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